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 DOES  POLICING THE RISK SOCIETY HOLD THE ROAD RISK? 
 Jérôme  Ferret * and  Vincent  Spenlehauer ** 
 Ericson and Haggerty’s book,  Policing the Risk Society (1997), sets out to annul Bittner’s classical, 
coercion-based reading of the police and replace it with a radically new paradigm that foregrounds 
the panoptical or knowledge work dimension of the police and its potential to serve the interests of 
non-police social-disciplinary institutions. In this article, we test this neo-Foucauldian paradigm 
on the basis of a body of research into road traffi c policing. As a result, we observe that though non-
police owner-managers of new risks challenge the societal immanence, centrality and publicness of 
police organizations, with time, these challenges fail. We therefore argue that Ericson and Haggerty’s 
notion of panoptical policing should be taken as a theoretical innovation, which, far from 
eliminating Bittner’s paradigm, enhances it with a new force. 
 Introduction 
 Ericson’s and Haggerty’s 1997 book,  Policing the Risk Society (hereafter EH), represents a 
formidable epistemological gamble: one which, if successful, would be a watershed in 
the social sciences of policing, for it would mean the supplanting of the classical Egon 
Bittner (1970) model. Let us recall that Bittner defi nes the role of the police in modern 
societies as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable force — given that (and 
this is very important) the police are characterized less by their actual use of violence 
than by their virtual capacity to master all private use of such violence (Monjardet 1996; 
Brodeur 2003). And, in spite of the endless attacks it has been subjected to since its 
publication ( Ocqueteau 2004 ), Bittner’s thesis appears to resist all attempts at 
falsifi cation. But does it? Maybe not in the case of EH. 
 Taking advantage of the dissension regarding the risk society caused by the work of 
Ulrich Beck 1 (2001), EH set out to annul Bittner’s classical, coercion-based reading and 
replace it with a radically new paradigm: one that foregrounds the role of the police in 
the production and processing of information and expert knowledge — they invoke 
Bruno  Latour’s (1987) concept of the  ‘ centre of calculation ’ — for public or private non-
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 1  To sum Beck up briefl y, the risk society is characterized by the signifi cant and increasing role of organized social practices — in 
science, economics, industry and politics — intended to increase our knowledge, and thus our control and distribution, of the risks 
 ‘ modern ’ scientifi c and technological development has either concretely caused or brought to the attention of our societies via 
the  ‘ off-territorialization ’ effects so brilliantly adduced by Anthony Giddens. The extent of these organized social practices thrusts 
human societies into a  ‘ second modernity ’ or, to put it more precisely, into the age of refl exive modernity. 
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police institutions. 2 We see it as important to note the opening up of this new interpretative 
network and discuss it in depth in the light of empirical fi ndings. It is not a matter here 
of establishing a validation or a defi nitive overall refutation. Rather, we intend to take 
advantage of the opportunity provided by the two authors to suggest other cumulative 
avenues; and this would have been impossible without the shockwave generated by EH’s 
book, the great merit of which is that it decompartmentalizes the policing entity by 
setting it at the core of a society placed at risk. The constructive testing we propose is 
based on a body of inductive, diachronic and/or synchronic research into  ‘ road risk 
policing ’ (Carnis  et al. 2006; Hamelin and  Spenlehauer 2005 b ), which we have carried 
out with a small number of close colleagues around the world — in the United States, 
Quebec, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Australia and New Zealand. 3 
 To shrink the thought-provoking notion of  ‘ policing the risk society ’ to that of 
 ‘ policing the road risk society ’ presents at least  three advantages. The fi rst has to do with 
the fact that road risk  ‘ consumes ’ a great deal of police effort. It is currently estimated 
that, in the OECD countries, some 10 – 20 per cent of police manpower resources go into 
policing the roads. The California Highway Patrol alone accounts for 13 per cent of 
police numbers for the entire state. In New Zealand, the Road Policing Branch of the 
single national police force represents a quarter of the force’s budget. 4 In other words, 
then, in the world of policing, the road risk police can in no way be considered a minority 
entity. On the contrary, it is a large-looming one and, moreover, a continuous, stable 
feature of police histories. 
 This brings us to the second advantage: the road risk society and its policing have 
considerable historical and geographical thickness. In America, the beginnings of the 
road risk society (RRS) can be dated roughly to the advent of the famous Model T Ford 
in 1910. In Europe, Australia and Japan, the process came about later and less suddenly. 
But, whatever the circumstances, observation of all industrialized nations everywhere 
reveals a period of at least 50 years during which police organizations (PO) evolved in 
response to the road risk, and allows us to discern general,  ‘ off-territorial ’ trends and 
patterns. Study of road risk policing represents a broad and substantial empirical input 
into the innovative ideas initiated by EH. 
 2  Comparing Bittner’s and EH’s respective theories of police might seem rather daring in many respects: for obvious reasons, 
Bittner has not been in position to situate his thought in relation to the social theory of (proliferating social-constructed) risks, 
to the fortuitous exception of the dangerous classes risk, which is central to Bittner; Bittner’s ethno-methodological approach has 
nothing in common with EH’s ambition to go beyond police studies in order to contribute to critical social theories, etc. It remains 
that since Bittner’s model has been somehow dominant within police studies the three last decades, its evocation could usefully 
bring out the innovative strength of EH’s model. For instance, when EH insist on the capital knowledge work dimension of police 
in the risk society, they imply that Bittner exaggerated the cardinality of the police as a mechanism of potential distribution of non-
negotiable force within society. For an interesting and more developed comparison of Bittner and EH, see  Brodeur (2001) . 
 3  In addition to the two authors, this small informal research network comprises: Laurent Carnis, Fabrice Hamelin, Anne Kletzlen, 
Claudine Pérez-Diaz and Anaïk Purenne. Traffi c policing was apprehended through various angles: institutional, functional, 
professional, historical, etc. The methods of inquiry used for on-site fi eldwork are: interviews, data-mining, administrative (i.e. 
annual reports, peer reviews, etc.) and academic (scarce) literature and archives studying, press review, (participative) observation 
of operations, etc. As an example, two researchers spent (two plus two) weeks in New Zealand and one researcher spent three 
months in Montreal studying the municipal traffi c policing in this city. All costs considered in this research  ‘ programme ’ amounted 
to around 700,000 Euros. A large part of the academic output of this research investment can be found in the References. 
 4  ‘ Mother, What Did Policemen Do When There Weren’t Any Motors? ’ is the jokey but unerring title of an article by British 
historian, Clive  Emsley (1991) . 
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 Lastly, the third advantage of focusing on road risk policing stems from its early and 
deep globalization ( Kellens and Pérez-Diaz 1997 ). Challenging EH’s (implicitly) 
universal theory on risk society policing raises the methodological diffi culty for the 
challengers of putting forward evidences and counter-evidences drawn from very 
different historical and/or regional contexts. 5 However, and fortunately, shall we say, in 
the road policing domain, local actors have often thought and still often think global! 
For instance, the diffusion of speed-camera systems from the early 1990s (for instance, 
in the state of Victoria in Australia) until now (France began to invest in such technology 
in 2003) resembles a success story of international  ‘ policy transfer ’ that circumvented 
what was seen on regional scenes as untouchable law principles (i.e. the necessary 
presence, in France or Great Britain, of a police offi cer when a speeding infringement 
occurs). Slightly anticipating on what follows, it can also be noted that, at the end of the 
1940s, the French private insurance companies owed their economic survival 6 to their 
well inspired imitation of the way American insurers had commenced to  ‘ exploit ’ the 
road accidents risk after the First World War (Hamelin and Spenlehauer 2008 ;  OECD 
1990 ). Concisely, the examples that our argument draws on relate to issues and practices 
at stake in similar terms within most of the road risk policing milieus of OECD 
countries. 7 
 Policing the Risk Society and Policing the Road Risk Society: First Test 
 In this fi rst test, we intend to analyse in historical depth the development of road risk 
policing in the United States and the history of the interaction between the POs 
concerned and the environment of the public and private owners of road risks. 
 Clear evidence of police  ‘ riskifi cation ’ 
 In a fi rst approximation, we shall model the changes within POs in respect of the 
emergence of a road risk society according to a simple three-part sequence: 
 (1)  Historically and geographically situated socio-technical phenomena (i.e. the Ford T in 
the United States) cause the appearance of road risks in a given governed part of the 
world. 
 (2)  Social and/or interest groups (car manufacturers, for instance) socially reconstruct 
these road risks ( Hacking 2000 ;  Bardet 2008 ) so as ultimately to pressure the POs to 
 ‘ help ’ them manage and control the risks to their own advantage. 
 (3)  To meet these pressing demands, police organizations evolve into road risk  ‘ centres of 
calculation ’ . 
 An eloquent illustration of this process is provided by the way in which American 
insurance companies and automobile manufacturers joined forces in the early 1920s, 
 5  This diffi culty gets aggravated when one writes an article of limited size. For in-depth context analysis and comparison 
(internationally and diachronically) concerning most of the evidences invoked here, cf. Carnis et al. (2005),  Ferret et al. (2007) , 
and issue 58(3)/2005, entitled  ‘ Polices et  “ policing ” de la route: un nouveau regard sur la sécurité ’ of the French journal devoted 
to police,  Les cahiers de la sécurité intérieure . 
 6  The creation of social security in 1946 went de jure with the nationalization of occupational accidents ’ insurance. 
 7  Of course, some regional or historical curiosities remain, but we did not consider them here, since our objective consists of 
challenging EH’s  ‘ off-territorial ’ theory. 
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using the National Safety Council (NSC) — an NGO still functioning today — to put road 
accident injuries on the policy agenda of municipalities and counties, and of their police 
forces in particular ( Bernardin 2006 ;  Hamelin 2006 ). The aim was to set up a road 
accident insurance industry to take advantage of the enormous potential created by the 
rise of the car. This made it essential that the accident risk be known and measured, and 
the solution opted for was that of convincing local authorities to order their police 
forces to document the risk in a  ‘ Taylorized ’ (i.e. systematic and uniform) way in all 
parts of the country. In this way, the insurance companies were able to pass on to the 
public sector the prohibitive expense of assessing this specifi c road risk. Subjection of 
local police forces to the knowledge requirements of the insurance companies crossed 
a decisive institutional threshold in 1934, when the NSC founded the NUTI, the 
Northwestern University Traffi c Institute ( McEnnis 1952 ). This was where the future 
chiefs of local traffi c police units were trained, and this training was fi nanced by 
scholarships from the insurance groups and the automobile industry. This situation, 
then, confi rms the three interlocking theses advanced by EH: transformation of police 
organizations and police work in response to the emergence of a new risk; a move 
towards greater knowledge work in police activity; and the upstream formatting and 
Taylorization of police knowledge work by non-police risk management organizations 
in the interests of meeting their own specifi c needs. 8 
 Limitations 
 Nonetheless, this three-part sequential model very quickly reveals its limitations in 
respect of many of our empirical observations. For example, if we pursue the prehistory 
of modern road policing during the between-wars period, we fi nd that the insurance 
companies and automobile manufacturers imposed much more than simple knowledge 
requirements on local police forces; the latter were also required to  ‘ manage ’ to  ‘ really ’ 
reduce the road risk. For the two groups with common interests, it was important that 
the public should not equate the car with a death machine and so resort to alternative 
means of transport ( McShane 1997 ). Prior to the cognitive, political and industrial 
furore triggered by Ralph Nader’s (1965) book,  Unsafe at Any Speed , 9 American car 
makers had steadfastly refused to take any design and manufacturing measures to render 
their cars safer, on the grounds that this would push prices up to unacceptable levels 
(Eastman 1984). 10 In addition, a purely private-sector, insurance-based regulation of 
road risk was unthinkable at the time: the risk of serious accidents was so high that 
insurance for bodily harm was neither compulsory nor affordable for motorists. Thus, 
the development of the car society necessarily called for less risk taking on the part of 
drivers; and the two interest groups were extremely keen to see the police do their 
traditional job of traffi c law enforcement on the public highway. 
 8  ‘ In this context of compliance-based law enforcement based on regulation and the scientifi c knowledge of risk, the police are 
transformed  … they are driven by the knowledge requirements of other institutions that engage in compliance policing ’ ( Ericson 
and Haggerty 1997: 49 ). 
 9  Working from road accident and epidemiological research ( Haddon  et al. 1964 ), the book demonstrated the importance of the 
 ‘ car design factor ’ in the rate and gravity of road accidents. But Nader went further, with a scrupulous dissection of the way the road 
safety  ‘ policy subsystem ’ ( Jones and Baumgartner 2005 ) masked the role of the  ‘ car design factor ’ . 
 10  The argument  ‘ Cars don’t kill people, people kill people ’ is still invoked today by many manufacturers whenever the threat of 
imposing limits on car engines looms. 
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 In general terms, this means that Road Risk Policing (RRP) was not created by 
ignoring the traditional police identity; rather, it presented as a hitherto unexploited 
area for expression of this basic professional specifi city. We shall come back to this, but 
let us say for the moment that what is involved is as much a  ‘ policifi cation ’ of road risk 
as a  ‘ riskifi cation ’ of the police. This nuance forces us to highlight a notable shortcoming 
of the three-part sequential model outlined above: it attributes the major transformations 
of police organizations (part 3 of the model) to factors external to the organizations 
themselves, despite the undeniable existence of internal considerations. However, 
before we go into this matter in the second part of the article, let us take a look at the 
overall pressures on police forces resulting from the development of the road risk 
society. Our analysis makes it clear that pressures do not necessarily cause transformations, 
and that when transformations occur, they do not necessarily fi t with EH’s contentions. 
 The proliferation of risk owners and its consequences 
 First, it must be remembered that in all so-called modern societies, widespread use of 
motorized vehicles — buses, trucks, cars, motorcycles, mopeds — triggers social processes 
of creation and development of road risks that cannot necessarily be encapsulated in 
a  ‘ road safety ’ or  ‘ traffi c safety ’ thematic. In early-twentieth-century Australia, which is 
to say mainly in Sydney and Melbourne, the history of post-motorization road risk 
merges with that of the risk of an urban congestion hampering the country’s economic 
progress. In France, Anne  Kletzlen (2000) has shown that before the mid 1960s, the 
main road risk — the one that determined the content of the Highway Code — had to 
do with damage to roads caused by buses and trucks, and to a lesser extent with road 
accidents: these latter were perceived not as negative public health events, but as road 
traffi c malfunctions. In New Zealand after the First World War, non-payment of the 
various road taxes by users — whether professionals or not — was considered a cardinal 
risk in that it endangered the fi nancing and upkeep of road infrastructures in the 
already diffi cult context of a large territory with a small population ( Spenlehauer 
2005 ). 
 Behind the host of concrete forms road risk can take in a motorized society is the 
functioning of numerous actors we can describe as  ‘ social problem owners ’ (Gusfi eld 
1981). The group is a very diverse one: insurance companies, car manufacturers, 
departments of transportation, automobile clubs, temperance leagues, research 
centres, city councils, breath-analyser manufacturers, etc. They may be big or small, 
dynamic or lethargic. They interact symbolically, legally or in decision-making terms, 
and in a range of ways including alliances, confl ict, allegiance, subordination and 
mediation. Their relationships change over time. Our research leads us to the assertion 
that the more motorized a society is, the more the owners of segments of road risk 
proliferate and the more their interaction complexifi es the overall transformational 
effect resulting from the various demands they make on the police. There follow two 
illustrations of this. 
 In fi ve, six or seven decades, we have moved from the simple original confi guration —
 the emergence of modern road safety policing as the cat’s paw of the insurance 
companies — to another, much more complex one in which road safety policing is 
contributing, slowly but surely, to a signifi cant shrinking of the automobile insurance 
market. Apart from the few places where bodily harm insurance is a government 
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monopoly — the Australian states of New South Wales and Victoria, New Zealand, 
Quebec, etc. — police and road policing no longer clearly serve the interests of the 
insurance business. True, checking operations by road traffi c police cuts down insurance 
premium evasion in the same way that NYPD’s  ‘ transit cops ’ cut back the free riding that 
was long a scourge for the city’s Metropolitan Transit Authority. It is also true the accident 
reports made out by traffi c police still keep the insurance companies ’ actuarial 
departments busy to some extent; but, in the developed countries, in which there is now 
scarcely any increase in car numbers and traffi c, a mechanical divergence exists between 
the insurance economy and public sector regulation of road safety via traffi c policing. 
Driven by a host of road safety problems, owners and the gradual elevation of road 
safety to the status of a major national issue, traffi c policing has little by little brought 
about a signifi cant cut in road risk, and, by extension, in the number and gravity of 
accidents and the insurance companies ’ turnover. 
 Without subscribing to a kind of democratic otherworldliness, it can be fairly said 
that, over time, road risk policing has ultimately served a pluralistically constructed 
general interest to the point of undermining the private industrial interests that 
initially, in between-wars America, had begotten this sort of risk policing. The 
history of road safety policies in modern societies neatly exemplifies the gradual 
emergence of the extra-parliamentary  ‘ round table ’ politics that Ulrich  Beck (1994) 
urges on us as a way of adapting parliamentary democracy to the issues of the risk 
society. 
 Our next illustration is just what is needed to temper this exciting hypothesis. In 
another article (Hamelin and Spenlehauer 2006), we showed that the creation of the 
California Highway Patrol in 1929 met two objectives pursued by the State of California 
and its government. The fi rst of these was improved road risk management: reduction 
of the number of accidents via standardized application of the California Motor Vehicle 
Act of 1915, etc. The second was to provide the State of California with a sovereign 
police body entrusted with law enforcement, surveillance and arrest of suspects in cases 
being handled by local and county police forces, plus gun control and other duties in 
every part of the state. 
 The situation can be recapped as follows: in a given society, the social and political 
objectifi cation of road risk can provide the opportunity (Kingdon 1995) for a territorial 
government to transform the overall context of policing governance to its own 
advantage without the main aim being reduction of road risk or modifi cation of police 
approaches to such reduction. In short, the transformational energy of road risk can 
be rechannelled and  ‘ detransformationalized ’ . Moreover, the creation in 2000 of a 
Police Highway Patrol for rural areas in New Zealand 11 and the refounding of the 
Mossos d’Esquadra in Catalonia (Spain) ( Ferret  et al. 2007 ) 12 demonstrate that there is 
nothing historically or geographically exceptional about the situation-bending observed 
in California. 
 11  A part of the hidden agenda was discreet implementation of  ‘ soft ’ community policing strategies in economically depressed 
Maori areas. 
 12  The presence of these police offi cers on the Catalan road network signals, symbolically and in concrete terms, that there is no 
longer any place there for the Guardia Civil (national military police force). 
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 The Internal Impact of the Risk Society on Policing Organizations: Second Test 
 We can recap the above in the form of two interlocking details to be added to the EH 
paradigm. 
 First, while the emergence of a road risk society has unquestionably transformed the 
world of policing, its impact cannot be reduced to the simple expansion of road risk 
knowledge work in the POs. Far from it. Taken as a whole and with all their historical 
implications, the new demands being made on policing organizations are the outcome 
of the fact that numerous actors see these organizations as agencies for the enforcement 
of democratically conceived and voted traffi c laws; only certain actors see them as 
suppliers of information in the sense of institutional brokers of social information for 
unavowed reasons of (undemocratically coercive) social control. Thus, analysis of the 
social pressures on police organizations in terms of road risk management could 
conceivably re-establish the primary, progressive meaning of social control viewed as the 
capacity of a society for self-regulation. 13 
 Next, the number and differing status of the road problem owners claiming the right 
to a role in the defi nition of police aims and contributing to making police organizations 
more permeable do not call into question the latter’s original function as public-sector 
bodies working for the community as a whole. To put it simply, the POs are not becoming 
centres of calculation in the pay of those asking for services. If the impact of the demands 
made by the different owners of road risk implies a certain subjection of the policing 
system, this new relationship is broadly and fi rmly based on a view of the police as a 
public service: as the organic embodiment of the pursuit of the public interest or, as we 
have seen in the instance of the California Highway Patrol, an expression of reasons of 
state. Whatever the case, after its very private-specifi c-interests-oriented beginnings, the 
RRP provided by police organizations historically and ineluctably ends up by affi rming 
its publicness (Bozeman and Bretschneide 1994). This is no anodyne matter if the police 
are hypothesized fi rst as a very public organization, both in their relative independence 
of the economic authorities and their marked dependence on the political ones; and, 
second, as a body whose surveillance and protection of the public represents a potential 
source of biopolitics in the sense of a permanent technology for government intervention 
(Foucault 2008). 
 This is why we would now like to go more deeply into the issue of subjection with an 
account of our observations and analyses of how police organizations react to injunctions 
from private or public owners of road risk. In the interests of clarity, we focus solely on 
the road safety/public health aspect of road risk. Giving thought to what some authors 
call the  ‘ resilient cop culture ’ ( Punch  et al. 2002 ) means having to try to resolve the 
following enigma: numerous studies and scientifi c experiments have shown that user 
compliance with the main elements of the traffi c laws — blood alcohol levels, speed 
limits, seat belts, helmets — would radically diminish road risk (Armour 1984). The 
operational strategies and technology of intelligence-led traffi c law enforcement — speed 
cameras, miniaturized hyper-accurate breathalysers, road accident geographic 
information systems, etc. — are known and readily accessible. All kinds of cost – benefi t 
analyses have led to the conclusion that the implementation of such strategies based on 
 13  For an excellent historical outline of how American social scientists explored this notion of social control in the fi rst half of the 
twentieth century, cf.  Ross (1984) . 
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the intensive use of this technology shows economic rates of return of several hundred 
per cent! But, even so, if we look at the worldwide road safety Olympics, the so-called 
 ‘ models ’ of excellence continue to display relatively high levels of risk in absolute terms. 
The United Kingdom, one of the medal winners in the fi eld, currently racks up a death 
rate per billion vehicle/kilometres traveled of around 6.7: at some 3,400 deaths per 
year, this is several times the number of voluntary homicides in the country. This basic 
enigma is crystal-clear evidence that in the world’s governed zones, the police 
organizations involved in road risk are far from having become implacable discipline-
and-punishment machines, even though the road risk society has long contained all the 
factors needed to make them so. 
 Professional ethos and organizational fi ltering 
 Replying to this fundamental question means drawing on the patiently built up corpuses 
of the French sociologist of police organizations,  Monjardet (1994 ; 1996), and the 
American sociologist,  Manning (1992) . In a painstaking study of complex professional 
rationales, Monjardet proves that the introduction of change into a police institution is 
only possible if the profession sees them as benefi cial in terms of material gain, status 
and symbolism. Manning reminds us of the obvious: that any introduction of technological 
processing of problems, however massive and sudden it may be, becomes an integral 
part of the POs ’ skilfully constructed social equilibriums. 
 Looking at the way available technology structures the POs in countries we have 
recently explored — England, Spain and France — we would say that a relative malleability 
is agreed to in return for a transactional-type model. Here, we return to the implications 
of Foucault’s (1975)  Discipline and Punish , admitting that there exists, in a form more or 
less diffuse according to the period, a biopolitical project for changing society. This 
project has to be orchestrated and technology, being an effective tool for POs working 
within this same society, can become intrusive; this is equally true for the post-modern 
democracies our analyses focus on. 
 And, yet, the project always fails partially. This partial failure cannot be put down to 
police rejection of technology, which, for a long time now, has clearly permeated the 
POs, especially in respect of road risk. Nor is the police ethos recalcitrant here: 
technology is professionally desirable because it boosts status. The partial failure takes 
place because we are dealing with police ways of working that modulate and cushion the 
impact of outside pressures in line with standards that have nothing to do with external 
performance criteria. As the PO retains sovereign power over moral and professional 
behaviour, agreement by police actors is fi ltered through the interests of the profession 
and the workings of its hierarchy. 
 To take one last historical example: an examination of the teaching programme at 
Northwestern University Traffi c Institute (NUTI) shows that since 1934, the theoretical 
training about accident reporting has ruled supreme, taking as its model the classical 
investigation of criminal cases: establishing the facts, looking for a motive, fi nding 
witnesses, collecting evidence, etc. ( Douthit 1992 ;  Kreml 1954 ). Even under the 
pressure — strong because fi nancially grounded — of American insurance companies, 
NUTI teaching refl ected the traditional professional interests of the police, and this led 
to a clear degree of non-compliance in respect of insurer requirements. What happened 
was that the police profession made accident reporting more a matter of work by a 
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police specialist (and no longer by a knowledge worker alienated from the results of his 
work). 14 This explains why, today, in absolutely all the countries we have been to, non-
police road safety specialists often accuse police offi cers of botching the fi lling of 
accident report forms. There exists, too, the sociological fi ction that these organizations 
are manipulated from outside by future-oriented managerial techniques. Technology 
and the various potential outside manipulators have an impact only on the condition 
that they are parties to internal contractualization. 
 Internal contracts around technology uses 
 A twenty-fi rst-century example of contractualization and of modulation of a road risk 
technology is available thanks to the apparent return to favour of road risk policing —
 especially in terms of staffi ng — in the joint policy of the British Home Offi ce and the 
powerful Association of Chief Police Offi cers (ACPO). The adoption and, very recently, 
extensive use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology were based 
on studies showing that offenders and common-law criminals commit signifi cantly more 
infractions of the highway code than the rest of the population. The outcome was the 
setting up of a national infrastructure comprising, at county level, mobile traffi c police 
units — cars and trucks — equipped with ANPR and connected by wifi  to the National 
Police Computer, the primary aim being surveillance (via detection) and harassment 
(via fi nes, vehicle confi scation, etc.) of offenders and criminals either known or under 
suspicion. Offi cially presented as a win – win strategy for crime policing and road safety, 
the ANPR system means de facto indulgence towards millions of  ‘ honest ’ British road 
users, in that it uses police manpower formerly occupied with speed or DUI deterrence, 
awareness campaigns in schools, etc. 
 A further example of mechanization that a priori fi ts better with EH’s model is the use 
of automatic fi xed speed cameras systems in the United Kingdom, France and Australia. 15 
With implementation of these systems due mainly to pressure from the departments for 
transport in these countries, we are faced here with implacable road risk policing 
machines — which function to all intents and purposes without police offi cers. Overall, 
installation of these systems demonstrates that police organizations can react to external 
pressures without being transformed. At a more subtle level, however, it should be noted 
that the very small number of offi cers involved in the management of these systems — to 
ensure the ongoing legality of their functioning — help the POs to use the systems as 
surveillance tools in the framework of judicial enquiries. We are dealing here with a 
quite defi nitely transactional rationale as opposed to one of subjection of the police. 
And, lastly, the handful of offi cers involved give the police organization they belong to 
a vital specialist status regarding the (undeniable) political risks run by the governments 
that put the systems into operation. 
 In the fi nal analysis, and whatever the system involved, the POs retain signifi cant 
autonomy and centrality. This modulation of technology appears most often as part of 
an economy of relationships between hierarchy levels. For police chiefs, then, the aim is 
 14  For a better understanding of why a penal system forces police traffi c offi cers to become experts in  ‘ road public order ’ rather 
than simple (knowledge) workers, see  Pollner (1987) . 
 15  The fact that these systems are run either within a decentralized framework (i.e. UK counties ’  ‘ speed-camera partnerships ’ ) or 
on a centralized state-owned basis (as in France or New Zealand) is indifferent for our argument. 
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often to regain power over internal personnel by offering in exchange the ease of work 
made available by technological tools: for example, a better fi t between professional 
and private life can be made possible by improved governability of work. It should be 
underlined, however, that in all these situations, the information manufactured by 
police offi cers rarely moves outside the police family, and within it is subject to constant 
negotiation, for the tools are also virtually means of monitoring and sanctioning policing 
performance. Thus, the upper echelons bring very cautious support to the introduction 
of new technology into police work, for fear of fi nding themselves cut off from the 
grassroots workers who have a monopoly of the raw data. And, so, where road risk is 
concerned, there is absolutely no reason for automatically confusing police use of 
information technology with Taylorization and alienation of the results of police work 
for the benefi t of non-police institutions. 
 Working for legitimacy/relations with the public 
 In contrast with the isolationist, monocultural image typifi ed by the recurring fi gure of 
the crime fi ghter, the road traffi c policeman is not an automaton that notes infractions 
and grimly writes tickets. In a democracy, the everyday legitimacy granted to the police 
by a large part of the community is a sine qua non of police functioning, not to say of its 
continuing existence. And, given the core place of road transport in our societies, this 
granting of legitimacy can only happen, at least in part, if the POs send out convincing 
signals to the effect that traffi c law enforcement is practised with discretion and is not a 
blind, implacable, brutal machine. In the absence of such signals, relations between 
police and the population go downhill ( Wilson and Chappell 1971 ), with consequences 
ranging from a fall in the clear-up rate to deterioration of the mental health of police 
offi cers. In  ‘ second modernity ’ societies, there exists a deep-rooted culture of permanent 
challenge to the validity, relevance and honesty of traffi c law enforcement:  ‘ You’re just 
making money for the government ’ ;  ‘ Why aren’t you out catching the real criminals? ’ ; 
 ‘ Don’t try and tell me that sign’s in the right place ’ ;  ‘ It’s thanks to you people lose their 
licences and their jobs ’ ; and  ‘ Why don’t you book all those guys with straight-through 
Harleys who keep me awake every night? ’ . These are just fi ve performative examples 
among thousands of this quasi-universal attitude. 
 Faced with this stance 16 — one all the stronger for being shared by a lot of police 
offi cers — the police organization has no choice but to come up with compromises; and 
so we fi nd the big chief putting out policy statements about  ‘ zero tolerance for marijuana 
smokers at the wheel ’ , while, at the same time, offi cers on the street are showing a 
greater degree of tolerance ( Gusfi eld 1975 ). At operational level, strategies become 
institutionalized, which limits the repressive side of traffi c law enforcement, often in 
favour of deterrence (for example (in Britain), not increasing the number of speed 
cameras, but increasing the number of sites where they can be installed), or prevention 
(issuing written warnings rather than tickets), or educational programmes. 
Implementation of these a-repressive strategies goes hand in hand with demands, 
 16  See  Purenne (2005) for a description of how the introduction of road safety into Montreal’s municipal community policing 
policy kicked off a bottom-up process of transformation of road policing in the city. This article backs up our earlier comments on 
proliferation of road risks and their owner-managers ( Hamelin and Spenlehauer 2005 a ). 
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notably in terms of police offi cer skills, that can change the public face of the POs in 
many different ways. 17 
 Conclusion 
 Given the EH paradigm as summed up in their conclusion, together with their multiple 
invocations of Foucault, we shall begin by quoting a warning from the philosopher 
himself on the interpretation of his book,  Discipline and Punish (1977):  ‘ The automatic 
nature of power — the mechanical character of the systems in which it takes shape — is 
absolutely not the book’s thesis .... To study the way in which attempts have been made 
to rationalize power  … and to demonstrate the importance of the part played by the 
theme of the machine, the gaze, surveillance, transparency, etc., is not to say that power 
is a machine, nor that such an idea is born mechanically! ’ ( Perrot 1980: 34 ). This was 
Foucault’s reply to the historians who accused him of shoring up the book’s thesis with 
selective, not to say biased, use of archival material. 
 What the author of  Discipline and Punish has to say is simple and seems to us to fi t with 
our criticisms of the EH paradigm. Surveillance projects undeniably exist in modern 
societies; but they are destined either to remain projects or to take shape only partially, 
as demonstrated by completed historical experiments. 18 Such projects are real, but do 
not cover the full reality of the situation. By focusing their argument on plans for the 
subjection of POs rather than their day-to-day workings, EH seem to be using the 
Foucault paradigm to justify an ideal typical system of knowledge generating, without 
real empirical basis, one excessively security-oriented conception of  ‘ state power ’ and 
politics. 
 Analysis of the implementation of projects designed to transform police forces into 
panoptic bodies shows that these projects are always paralleled by contradictory, 
traditional law enforcement projects targeting the risk to be dealt with. The subjection 
projects are centrifugal in the sense that they fuel the disintegration of the immanence 
of the POs. By contrast, the demands of traditional monopolistic law enforcement that 
are indissociable from these projects are centripetal in character. By making a moderate 
law enforcement effort in a new risk fi eld, the POs succeed remarkably well in breaking 
 17  Thus, since 1995, an inadequate grasp of Spanish disqualifi es candidates from the California Highway Patrol Academy entrance 
exam, bringing a major change in the make-up of the force. 
 18  One example is the Paris police force, independent of the city’s system of justice that Louis XIV established by decree in 1667. 
In her perceptive dissection of this critical moment in the history of the French police, Hélène  L’Heuillet (2001) shows clearly 
that, prior to that year, the Paris police, as an arm of the judiciary, identifi ed (potential) disrupters of public order, arrested them 
and handed them over to the courts. After 1667, with a view to  ‘ political anticipation ’ , the  ‘ Paris Lieutenant for the Police ’ set up 
on the king’s behalf a system of monitoring and surveillance of the entire Paris population and its activities, wherever these might 
take place:  ‘ The king knows everything and can act surely and promptly. ’ It should be pointed out, however, that Louis XIV was 
not behaving like today’s owner-managers of risks, for he required the police force to make itself an  intelligent panoptic political 
watchdog. This  ‘ new ’ Paris police certainly had a contingent character, given that without the decree of 16 March 1667, it might 
never have existed. But this  contingency was quickly replace by a marked  immanence , for the force’s daily activities were decided on 
and organized from within, via multiple transactions with the royal authorities, the justice system and the people. Three centuries 
later, the absolute monarch has been replaced by governments that, in the democratic give and take of second modernity societies, 
cannot turn a deaf ear to the demands of a large number of owner-managers of risks whose aim is to align the panoptic capacity 
of police organizations with their own interests. Moreover, in the risk society, owner-managers of risks, unlike Louis XIV, possess 
an expertise independent of that of the police, which allows them to formulate precise demands regarding the confi guration of 
police panopticism. Lastly, second modernity societies bristle with information technology likely, according to EH, to robotize and 
dehumanize the functioning of the planned police panopticism and render it, in contrast with the Paris Lieutenant for the Police, 
unintelligent and servile. 
FERRET AND SPENLEHAUER
12
free of the demands for compliance the owners seek to impose on them. All things 
considered, then, while police forces change with the proliferating dynamics of 
disciplinary regulation that characterize risk societies, they nonetheless succeed in 
maintaining their core status within these dynamics while remaining themselves, namely 
basically as described by Bittner. This key role means they are now especially well placed 
to face and above all digest the multiple pressures they are subjected to. This is why we 
cannot consider risk-oriented police forces as embodying the rebirth of a maximum 
security society ( Marx 1988 ) — at least not without making it clear that the confi guration 
is latent or virtual. At present, there is still little empirical evidence in support of EH’s 
panoptical policing thesis. 
 It is true that the proliferation of risk regulation projects opens up new potential 
fi elds of police intervention, not only on the margins of society, but at its very core. 
However, since the police have limited resources, they cannot move into all these fi elds 
and may even attempt to infl uence governments to keep them closed via legislation or 
regulation. Police forces are compelled to make strategic choices in the management of 
their risk portfolios, and there exists in all these portfolios a major risk that EH neglect 
because it is in no way post-modern and its owners, as they see it, do not deserve actor 
status: the everyday risk of Hobbes’s  ‘ war of all against all ’ . Thus the EH paradigm 
contains an overtly facile concept that merits our mistrust when we look into contemporary 
policing issues: the facile concept of POs — and, by extension,  ‘ state ’ action — as subject 
to a special system of command that is itself symptomatic of a thought mode made 
dominant by an inbuilt, exaggerated level of privilege that is, by its very nature, 
illegitimate. 
 Loader and Walker (2006) have already pointed out the prejudices underlying the 
state scepticism that determines Anglo-American criminological approaches. 19 As our 
contribution to this transatlantic dialogue, we suggest that POs be seen as social agencies 
that are public in their growing dependence, not only on economic authorities with the 
weight of the political authorities behind them, but, above all, on the community from 
which they draw the  ultima ratio of their legitimacy. This approach would take account 
of static connotations of the terms  ‘ state ’ and  ‘ police ’ , not widely accepted in a 
sociological approach. The socio-political context in which the activity of the hypersocial 
POs takes place would gain by being perceived not as an imaginary city in which each 
individual would a priori have a clearly assigned place according to a crypto-functionalist 
view of things, but as  ‘ a road, or even a road network, on which active individuals 
circulate in pursuit of what Tocqueville called  “ self-interest rightly understood ” ’ ( Pavel 
2008: 56 ). We would no longer attribute to the police — and its supposed risk-regulating 
puppet masters — the task of making sure that the  ‘ little ’ actors  ‘ stay in their place ’ , but 
rather that of regulating mass traffi c and the risks associated with it. Far from hampering 
transactions between private individuals, and the activity of public interest clubs, the 
 ‘ police ’ would make them possible within certain elastic, future-friendly limits. As it 
happens, the traffi c metaphor used by  Pavel (2008) fi ts with Loader’s invocation of 
neutralist philosophy ( Loader and Walker 2006: 186 ): it is as if  ‘ politics ’ , the  ‘ state ’ and 
the  ‘ police ’ are meta-active and neutral or, more exactly, aiming at neutrality in relation 
to activities that, while private, remain vital to the sound functioning of all this. 
 19  They identify four variants of this state scepticism: the state as meddler, partisan, cultural monolith and idiot. See also Ferret 
(2004). 
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 The upshot is that the theses of minimal public policing are automatically undermined: 
how could one design a freeway with no traffi c rules or signposting? In addition, the 
new world of networks and physical and social mobility is perfectly compatible with an 
infi nite range of political arrangements and notions of the public good. This is why it 
can also be justifi ably maintained that the POs enjoy a centrality that is problematic, 
worrying and potentially destructive of freedom. At the same time, it cannot be ignored 
that they face a categorical imperative to guarantee the protection of the common good: 
security as a thick public good ( Loader and Walker 2006: 183 ). Thus, this centrality 
certainly exists: it is maltreated and, at the same time, renegotiated under the infl uence 
of multiple centrifugal and centripetal forces in a very transactional world. In fi ne, we 
propose the somewhat provocative hypothesis that EH’s notion of panoptical policing 
should be taken as a theoretical innovation that, far from eliminating Bittner’s paradigm, 
enhances it with a new force. 
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